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ABSTRACT 
In August 2015, the Energy Transition Towards Green Growth Act set new targets aiming at a 
diversification of the electricity production mix in France. One of these goals requires France 
to diminish the share of nuclear energy in its electricity generation mix from an average of 75 
to 50 per cent by 2025. To do so, the 2015 act created new legal tools to force the shutdown 
of various nuclear energy reactors. However, as this paper highlights, these tools remain 
inadequate and inefficient to allow the Government to order the shutdown of a reactor for 
energy policy purposes. The first demonstration of this unsatisfactory situation was provided 
by the shutdown negotiation of the nuclear plant of Fessenheim, the oldest in operation. The 
lack of adapted legal mechanisms led to a costly agreement at the expense of public money. 
As it is, this situation seriously imperils the achievement of the electricity production 
diversification goals and the realisation of the energy transition in France. 
  
                                                          
* Romain Mauger, PhD, Postdoctoral Researcher, Groningen Centre of Energy Law, Faculty of Law, University 
of Groningen, The Netherlands. Email: r.j.g.mauger@rug.nl. This paper is the result of a research conducted as 
invited researcher at the Faculty of Law of the North-West University (South Africa) during multiple stays from 
2015 to 2017. The author would like to address his special thanks to the multiple reviewers of this paper for their 




The French nuclear programme has been rolled out since the 1970s as a reaction to the 
first oil crisis.1 It led to the construction of 58 nuclear energy reactors, of which 54 were 
connected to the grid in only 16 years, from 1978 to 1994. In 1981 alone, 8 reactors entered 
into operation.2 As a result, the total installed nuclear capacity in France has been 63.2 GW 
since 2002.3 In 2016, it represented 72,3 per cent of the electricity produced in France, even 
though constituting ‘the lowest share since 1988’ because of a low load-factor.4 This 
accomplishment was made possible by France’s ‘long tradition of state-centrism and top-
down management’,5 or Jacobinism.6 However, the downsides of this rapid increase backed 
by the state are manifold. First, as multiple reactors are fast approaching their 40 years of 
operational life,7 the question of their revamping, replacement or decommissioning is a very 
acute one, creating a ‘cliff effect’.8 This situation entails the need for extensive investments in 
the energy system9 as well as the adoption of a legal framework adapted to the situation. 
Second, it has led to a situation described as nuclear lock-in, safeguarded by path-dependent 
                                                          
1 G Vindt, ‘1974 : le plan Messmer choisit l’option du tout-nucléaire’ (Alternatives Economiques, 1 September 
2014) <www.alternatives-economiques.fr/1974-plan-messmer-choisit-loption-nucleaire/00067465> accessed 17 
November 2017. 
2 EDF, ‘Document de référence - Rapport financier annuel 2016’ (2017) 19 
<www.edf.fr/sites/default/files/contrib/groupe-edf/espaces-dedies/espace-finance-fr/informations-
financieres/informations-reglementees/document-de-reference/edf-ddr-2016-fr.pdf > accessed 24 November 
2017. 
3 Ibid. 
4 M Schneider and others, ‘The World Nuclear Industry Status Report 2017’ (2017), 44 – 45 
<www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/20170912wnisr2017-en-lr.pdf> accessed 18 November 2017. 
5 T Teräväinen, M Lehtonen, and M Martiskainen, ‘Climate change, energy security, and risk – debating nuclear 
new build in Finland, France and the UK’ (2011), 39 Energy Policy 6, 3436. 
6 B Sovacool, ‘The History and Politics of Energy Transitions – Comparing Contested Views and Finding 
Common Ground’, in D Arent and others (dir.), The Political Economy of Clean Energy Transitions (Oxford 
University Press, 2017) 18. 
7 Schneider and others (n 4) 46. 
8 N Maïzi, and E Assoumou, ‘Future prospects for nuclear power in France’ (2014) 136 Applied Energy, 858. 
9 The revamping option alone would cost EDF €2013100 Bn between 2014 and 2030.  Cour des Comptes, ‘Le 
rapport public annuel 2016 – Tome I – Les observations’ (2016) 
<www.ccomptes.fr/sites/default/files/EzPublish/RPA2016-Tome-1-integral.pdf > accessed 24 November 2017. 
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political institutions,10 complicating the adoption of a legal framework which would break 
with the existing state of affairs.11 
In France, among the many texts composing the legal framework for nuclear energy, there 
are a few milestones: the 1961 Atmospheric Pollutions and Smells Act, placing nuclear 
energy in the polluting and hazardous industrial facilities’ regime;12 a 1963 decree fully 
dedicated to its legal regime;13 the 2006 Transparency and Safety in Nuclear Matters Act, 
revising the regime for the creation, operation, shutdown and dismantling of nuclear energy 
facilities;14 and the 2015 Energy Transition Towards Green Growth Act (hereinafter Energy 
Transition Act), object of this paper, which rewrote many articles of the past framework and 
created new legal mechanisms aiming at allowing the Government to force the shutdown of a 
nuclear reactor for other reasons than safety alone.15 The idea here is to fulfil one of the most 
disputed and symbolic provisions of the Act: the objective to diminish the annual nuclear 
energy share in the electricity generation mix from an average of 75 to 50 per cent by 2025 
(hereinafter, 75-50 by 2025 target).16  
This paper assesses the mechanisms provided by the Energy Transition Act to reach this 
target by focusing on the upstream stage of nuclear energy facilities decommissioning: the 
forced shutdown of nuclear energy reactors and its recent legal regime in France. This stage 
                                                          
10 R Pin Lee, and S Gloaguen, ‘Path-dependence, lock-in, and student perceptions of nuclear energy in France: 
Implications from a pilot study’ (2015) 8 ERSS, 88. 
11 Legal scholars highlight the conflicting debates on this point in Parliament. See P Billet, ‘Transition 
énergétique et croissance verte : itinéraire et ambitions d'une loi’ (2015) 10 Énergie – Environnement – 
Infrastructures, dossier 6, 6. 
12 Loi n° 61-842 du 2 août 1961 relative à la lutte contre les pollutions atmosphériques et les odeurs et portant 
modification de la loi du 19 décembre 1917. See MB Lahorgue, ‘Les conditions juridiques de la mise à l’arrêt 
définitif des INB et les stratégies de démantèlement de l’AIEA : le choix de la France’ (2014) 1 RISEO, 27. 
13 Décret n° 63-1228 du 11 décembre 1963 relatif aux installations nucléaires. 
14 Loi n° 2006-686 du 13 juin 2006 relative à la transparence et à la sécurité en matière nucléaire. 
15 Loi n° 2015-992 du 17 août 2015 relative à la transition énergétique pour la croissance verte, art 126, 127. 
16 Ibid art 1. 
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constitutes a conditio sine qua non to a suitable decommissioning phase, as the thorough 
organisation of the first step allows adequately preparing the second one.  
Currently, there are only a few academic publications in English dealing with the French 
nuclear energy policy and even less on French nuclear energy law.17 Actually, most of the 
nuclear-related publications treat the topic from a technical18, economic19 or social20 point of 
view, or tackle it as part of wider energy policy questions.21 This article attempts to fill part of 
this gap, specifically concerning the legal tools available in France to organise the shutdown 
of nuclear facilities for reasons other than a direct safety threat. 
For the discussion in this paper, the author uses different terms, which need clarification. 
In French law, the post-operational phases in the life of a nuclear reactor are named mise à la 
fermeture,22 translated as shutdown, and démantèlement,23 translated as dismantling. There is 
then no direct translation of the term ‘decommissioning’.  
Concerning forced shutdown, it refers to the closing of the operational phase of a nuclear 
reactor decided by another legal person than the operator of the facility. In this case, ordered 
by the Government and for reasons not limited to a direct safety threat.  
 The following discussion is organised in four parts. First, the paper describes the legal 
framework for the shutdown of nuclear facilities in France before the 2015 Energy Transition 
Act. Second, it analyses the Energy Transition Act and its ambitious nuclear reduction targets 
                                                          
17 A Faro, ‘The legalities of leaving nuclear’ (2013) 69 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 1, 36 – 42. 
18 L Andriamasy, C Barros, and Q Liang, ‘Technical efficiency of French nuclear energy plants’ (2014) 46 
Applied Economics 18, 2119 – 2126; CP Barros, and S Managi, ‘French nuclear electricity plants: Productivity 
and air pollution’ (2016) 11 Energy Sources 8, 718 – 724.  
19 C Cany, and others, ‘Nuclear and intermittent renewables: Two compatible supply options? The case of the 
French power mix’ (2016) 95 Energy Policy, 135 – 146 ; R Malischek, and J Trüby, ‘The future of nuclear 
power in France: an analysis of the costs of phasing-out’ (2016) 116 Energy, 908 – 921. 
20 K Baker, ‘Using Cultural Theory to Analyze the Metagovernance of the Nuclear Renaissance in Britain, 
France, and the United States’ (2017) 34 RPR 2, 233 – 254 ; Pin Lee and Gloaguen (n 10) 86 – l99. 
21 K Andriosopoulos, and S Silvestre, ‘French energy policy: A gradual transition’ (2017) 106 Energy Policy, 
376 – 381. 




supplemented by inadequate tools. Third, it assesses the remaining legal barriers to a forced 
shutdown process. And fourth, the conclusion highlights the key takeaways of this research. 
 
2. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE SHUTDOWN OF NUCLEAR 
REACTORS IN FRANCE BEFORE THE ENERGY TRANSITION ACT 
Prior to the Energy Transition Act, the shutdown of nuclear facilities was possible in two 
cases: voluntarily, by request of the operator of the facility, or under constraint, for safety 
reasons.  
2.1. Voluntary shutdown by request of the operator 
The most common way to organise the shutdown of a nuclear reactor under the pre-
Energy Transition Act regime was by request of the facility operator,24 EDF, the only operator 
in France.25 In essence, the shutdown and dismantling of the nuclear facility required a prior 
authorisation26 delivered by the ministry in charge of energy after the opinion of the Nuclear 
Safety Authority (ASN)27 and a public enquiry.28 A 2007 decree specified that the operator 
was required to inform the authorities (ministers in charge of nuclear safety and ASN) at least 
three years before the intended shutdown date.29 An ad hoc decree could then be adopted to 
allow the operator to proceed to the shutdown and dismantling, specifying the safety measures 
to be taken.30  
                                                          
24 Particularly in: Environment Code, arts L 593-25 to -28. 
25 ‘Nuclear Power in France’ (World Nuclear Association, October 2017) <http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-a-f/france.aspx> accessed 17 November 2017. 
26 Environment Code, art L 593-25, para 1. 
27 See more at <www.french-nuclear-safety.fr/>. 
28 Environment Code, art L 593-26, para 1. 
29 Décret n° 2007-1557 du 2 novembre 2007 relatif aux installations nucléaires de base et au contrôle, en matière 
de sûreté nucléaire, du transport de substances radioactives, art 37. 
30 Ibid art 38.  
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2.2. Forced shutdown for safety reasons 
Under the former regime, it was possible to order the shutdown of a nuclear reactor, but 
only for safety reasons. 
Article L. 593-1 of the Environment Code stated that nuclear facilities were submitted to a 
special legal regime because of the risks or harms that they can present for public safety and 
health, or for the protection of nature and of the environment. If a malfunctioning nuclear 
facility could have an impact on these concerns, a decree could be adopted after opinion of the 
Conseil d’Etat31 and of the ASN to order its irrevocable shutdown and dismantling.32 The 
threat must, however, be serious and the provisions of the Environment Code be ineffective to 
prevent or reduce these risks adequately.33 These two criteria are cumulative.34 These 
limitations on the discretion of the Government exist to prevent abuse of this provision, 
consisting of the forced shutdown of a reactor which could otherwise be kept running 
according to the ASN and the operator.  
As a result, before the Energy Transition Act, the Government had no legal tools to decide 
unilaterally on the shutdown of the nuclear reactors in France on the ground of its energy 
policy. 
 
3. THE ENERGY TRANSITION ACT: AMBITIOUS NUCLEAR REDUCTION 
TARGETS, INADEQUATE TOOLS 
                                                          
31 The highest court for litigations involving the administration in France, and adviser of the Government on the 
legality for some of its drafts of law or decrees. 
32 Environment Code, art L 593-23. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Lahorgue (n 12) 34. 
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The Energy Transition Act was labelled as ‘one of the most important texts of the five-
year term’ by President François Hollande.35 This section analyses the provisions of this act 
related to forced nuclear reactor shutdown: first, by detailing its climate and nuclear 
objectives; second, by analysing the tools it provides to reduce the share of nuclear energy in 
the electricity mix; and third, by highlighting the still missing tools to force the shutdown of 
nuclear reactors on the basis of energy policy decisions (without having to pay expensive 
compensations for expropriation). 
3.1. A flagship energy act with ambitious climate and nuclear objectives 
As Kostas Andriosopoulos and Stephan Silvestre state, although “[h]istorically based on 
independence and sobriety criteria, French energy policy [and regulation] now prioritises the 
environmental and climate impact of its energy mix”.36 However, this new orientation 
actually started prior to the Energy Transition Act,37 although it considerably modified the 
state’s energy policy enshrined in articles L. 100-1 to -4 of the Energy Code. Article L. 100-1 
now places green growth38 at the top of energy policy, elaborates on already existing concerns 
(energy independence, competitive economy, energy affordability, environmental protection, 
guaranteed access to energy) and adds a new one: the contribution to the implementation of a 
European Union (EU) Energy Union.39 
Article L. 100-4 of the Energy Code formulates the new targets of the national energy 
policy, as written in article 1 of the Energy Transition Act. In these, France pledges to reduce 
its GHG emissions by three-quarters in 2050 compared to 1990, its final energy consumption 
                                                          
35 ‘Transition énergétique : Hollande détaille sa vision et veut accélérer’ Le Monde (20 September 2013) 
<www.lemonde.fr/planete/article/2013/09/20/hollande-detaille-sa-vision-de-la-transition-
energetique_3481711_3244.html#DRPmFXlK6HKdZTv2.99> accessed 17 November 2017. 
36 Andriosopoulos and Silvestre (n 21) 376. 
37 Ibid 377. 
38 Defined as ‘an economic development pattern respectful of the environment, at the same time energy-, 
resources- and carbon-efficient, socially inclusive, supporting the innovation potential and guardian of business 
competitiveness’, see Energy Code, L 100-1 para 1. 
39 Energy Code, L 100-1 para 7. 
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by half by 2050 in comparison to 2012, and its primary energy consumption of fossil fuels by 
30 per cent by 2030 compared to 2012 as well. Renewable energies are supposed to reach 32 
per cent of the gross final energy consumption by 2030, representing 40 per cent of the 
electricity production that year. In addition, as mentioned earlier, the energy policy goals also 
include the 75-50 by 2025 nuclear target. 
These targets are almost unanimously described as being ambitious by the media,40 
different businesses representatives,41 and legal scholars.42 Yet, some environmental non-
Governmental organisations consider them as insufficient to adequately address the challenge 
of climate change and the necessary reduction of CO2 emissions.43 
3.2. The inadequate tools provided by the Energy Transition Act to reduce the share 
of nuclear energy in the electricity production mix 
According to the Cour des Comptes (Court of Auditors), reaching the nuclear energy 75-
50 by 2025 target will require the shutdown of 17 to 20 reactors.44 The Energy Transition Act 
then provided a set of three mechanisms supposed to allow the Government to force the 
shutdown of various nuclear energy reactors for energy policy reasons. 
                                                          
40 P Le Hir, ‘La loi sur la transition énergétique définitivement adoptée au Parlement’ Le Monde (22 July 2015) 
<www.lemonde.fr/energies/article/2015/07/22/vote-final-pour-la-loi-de-transition-
energetique_4693996_1653054.html> accessed 17 November 2017 ; ‘Les grandes lignes de la loi de transition 
énergétique’ Les Echos (22 juil. 2015) <www.lesechos.fr/industrie-services/energie-
environnement/0203835212884-une-loi-pour-la-transition-energetique-1050492.php#> accessed 11 November 
2015. 
41 ‘Loi Transition Energétique et Croissance Verte : L’UFE salue un texte ambitieux mais reste dubitative sur les 
capacités de sa mise en œuvre’ (Union Française de l’Electricité, 23 July 2015) <ufe-
electricite.fr/presse/communiques-de-presse/article/loi-transition-energetique-et> accessed 17 November 2017 ; 
‘Des objectifs ambitieux pour la France mais des mesures qui ne permettront pas de les atteindre’ (France 
énergie éolienne, 4 March 2015) <http://fee.asso.fr/actu/loi-de-transition-energetique-des-objectifs-ambitieux-
pour-la-france-mais-des-mesures-qui-ne-permettront-pas-de-les-atteindre/> accessed 5 March 2016. 
42 A Darson, ‘Projet de loi sur la transition énergétique : ce qui attend les énergies renouvelables’ (2015) Droit de 
l’Environnement, 162. J Sénéchal, ‘La transition énergétique, aujourd'hui et maintenant ?’ (2015) RDI, 449. P 
Villeneuve, ‘La mobilité durable et les collectivités territoriales dans la loi relative à la transition énergétique’ 
(2016) AJCT, 25. 
43 A Bringault, ‘Transition énergétique : les bonnes intentions iront-elles jusqu’à la concrétisation ?’ (Transition-
energetique.org, 23 July 2015) <www.transition-energetique.org/2015/07/transition-energetique-les-bonnes-
intentions-iront-elles-jusqu-a-la-concretisation.html> accessed 29 July 2015. 
44 Cour des comptes (n 9) 130.  
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3.2.1. The installed nuclear capacity cap 
The first of these tools is the provision capping the total installed nuclear capacity at the 
2015 level: 63.2 GW. New article L. 311-5-5 paragraph 1 of the Energy Code specifies that an 
operating license cannot be delivered if it raises the installed capacity above this level. 
Consequently, to commission the third generation nuclear reactor (a European Pressurised 
Reactor, or EPR) which it is currently building in Flamanville, Manche (50), EDF will have to 
decommission an equivalent capacity, 1650 MW,45 at the same time. This provision was 
validated by a decision of the Conseil constitutionnel (CC), considering it compatible with the 
Constitution (and with the connected Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 
1789, called DDHC) and especially the right to private property (an issue studied deeper 
further below).46 
Yet, this mechanism does not place the Government in a position to deliver on its nuclear 
75-50 by 2025 target. Indeed, the electricity consumption in France stagnated since 2011 and 
the projections foresee a reduction by 2021 from 479 to 471 Terawatt hour (TWh)/year.47 To 
stabilise the nuclear installed capacity will therefore not be sufficient to automatically 
diminish its share in the electricity mix, as the total consumption of electricity is expected to 
decrease (as expected by the targets set in the act).  
3.2.2. The strategic plan 
The second tool created by the Energy Transition Act to allow the forced shutdown of 
various nuclear reactors is the strategic plan presented in article L. 311-5-7 of the Energy 
                                                          
45 ‘FLAMANVILLE 3 EPR PROJECT’, (EDF, 2017) <www.edf.fr/en/groupe-edf/producteur-industriel/carte-
des-implantations/centrale-nucleaire-de-flamanville-3/presentation> accessed 17 November 2017.  
46 CC, 13 August 2015, déc n° 2015-718 DC, Loi relative à la transition énergétique pour la croissance verte, 
cons 55 – 60. 
47 RTE, ‘Bilan prévisionnel de l’équilibre offre-demande d’électricité en France – Edition 2016’ (2016) 38, 
<www.rte-france.com/sites/default/files/bp2016_complet_vf.pdf> accessed 24 November 2017. 
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Code. According to its first paragraph, each operator producing more than a third of the 
national electricity output (thus concerning only EDF48) has to establish a strategic plan, 
presenting the actions it commits to implement in order to respect the security of supply and 
diversification of the electricity production targets set into the multiannual energy plan (MEP 
in English, PPE – programmation pluriannuelle de l’énergie – in French).  
 In a nutshell, the MEP, created by article 176 of the Energy Transition Act, is a 
‘comprehensive strategy which covers all aspects of energy policy and all forms of energy’.49 
Established by the Government with the participation of various stakeholders and revised 
every five years, its most authoritative part is a decree defining, amongst other things, the 
expected installed capacity for each renewable source of electricity to be attained at the end of 
each period.50  
The strategic plan suggests evolutions to undertake regarding electricity generation 
facilities, ‘in particular of nuclear energy’, to reach the MEP’s targets.51 This plan must be 
submitted for validation to the minister in charge of energy a maximum of 6 months after the 
publication of the MEP,52 and a new one must be prepared if  it is not compatible.53 Lastly, 
the operator reports each year to specialised permanent commissions of the Parliament on the 
implementation of the plan and on its contribution to the targets of the MEP.54  
The strategic plan is therefore supposed to constitute a privileged instrument to control the 
fulfilment of the Energy Transition Act targets and particularly of the one concerning nuclear 
                                                          
48 With its nuclear fleet alone, it is producing around 75 per cent of the electricity in France. 
49 ‘The Multiannual Energy Plan’ (2017) Ministère de la Transition écologique et solidaire, 1 <www.ecologique-
solidaire.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/4pages_PPE_GB_DEF_Web.pdf> accessed 17 November 2017. 
50 The first one was adopted in October 2016 by the Décret n° 2016-1442 du 27 octobre 2016 relatif à la 
programmation pluriannuelle de l'énergie. Full version of the MEP available at <www.ecologique-
solidaire.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/PPE%20int%C3%A9gralit%C3%A9.pdf> accessed 17 November 2017. 
51 Energy Code, art L 311-5-7 para 2. 
52 Ibid para 3. 
53 Ibid para 4. 
54 Ibid para 5. 
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electricity. In reality however, this tool seems unable to allow the forced shutdown of nuclear 
facilities for energy policy reasons. First of all, it had to build on a particularly blurry MEP 
regarding the contentious topic of nuclear reduction (nuclear being already the source of a 
long delay suffered by the MEP55). As a result, the MEP set a paltry and insufficient nuclear 
electricity production decrease objective of 10 to 65 TWh by 2023 compared to 2016.56 
Keeping in mind that the total nuclear output this year was 384 TWh (already quite low57), 
such an insignificant reduction by 2023 does not place France on track to reach its 2025 
nuclear share target. Second, this plan is prepared by EDF, the operator of the nuclear 
reactors, which will probably favour its financial interest over France’s energy policy. Third, 
the Government can only influence its outcome by the validation process, as it can reject it if 
unsuitable. This happened the 21 April 2017 when the then minister in charge, Ségolène 
Royal, asked EDF to revise its strategic plan, deemed incompatible with the electricity 
production diversification goals of the MEP, especially concerning the shutdown of nuclear 
and coal reactors.58 But this capacity to reject the plan does not guarantee that the new version 
will be compatible, as no provision allows the Government nor any other actor to take 
responsibility for it. The situation can remain obstructed and the planning of the necessary 
shutdowns to comply with the 2015 act is increasingly becoming more constrained by time. 
As of February 2018, no new plan has been submitted by EDF. Fourth, the Energy Transition 
Act does not require the plan to be made publicly available. Thus, the version submitted to the 
                                                          
55 Originally to be published at the end of 2015, it was finally out the 27 October 2016.  J Schorpp, ‘Transition 
énergétique : boucler la PPE en quelques mois s’annonce difficile’ (Contexte, 11 March 2015) 
<www.contexte.com/article/energie/transition-energetique-le-baclage-de-la-ppe-en-quelques-mois-face-a-des-
difficultes_27779.html > accessed 12 March 2016.   
56 MEP, ‘Volet relatif à l’offre d’énergie’ (Ministère de l'Ecologie, du Développement durable et de l'Energie, 27 
October 2016), 43.   
57 RTE, ‘Bilan électrique 2016’ (2016) <http://bilan-electrique-2016.rte-france.com/production/le-parc-de-
production-national/> accessed 24 November 2017. 
58 ‘EDF encouragé à modifier son plan stratégique’ (Batiweb, 5 May 2017) <www.batiweb.com/actualites/vie-




minister in April 2017 was not published, only a press release indicated that the board of EDF 
had validated its submission to the ministry,59 impeding the public to check its assumptions.   
 Subsequently, the delegation by the Government to EDF of the responsibility to plan 
and organise the shutdown of numerous nuclear reactors seems not to be the best way to 
achieve the nuclear energy reduction target. 
3.2.3. The Government commissioner 
A third tool aimed at controlling the shutdown plans is created by the same article L. 311-
5-7 of the Energy Code, but paragraph 6. On this basis, a Government commissioner is placed 
in each operator producing more than a third of the national electricity output. This 
commissioner is informed of investment decisions and can oppose them if incompatible with 
the goals of the strategic plan or, if it does not exist, with the MEP. According to paragraph 7, 
this opposition needs to be confirmed by the minister in charge of energy, and then the 
concerned investment decision can only be applied if the strategic plan is revised, in the same 
conditions as for its initial elaboration. 
This tool, supposed to ensure a tightened control over the shutdown goals, appears to be at 
best able to freeze the situation until the validation of a strategic plan, instead of fostering 
proactive governmental action on this matter. 
Therefore, the new legal tools provided by the Energy Transition Act to force the 
shutdown of nuclear energy facilities fail to provide any guarantee that its own targets will be 
                                                          
59 ‘Examen par le Conseil d'administration d'EDF du plan stratégique déclinant la première période de la 
Programmation Pluriannuelle de l'Energie (PPE)’ (EDF, 6 April 2017) <www.edf.fr/groupe-edf/espaces-
dedies/journalistes/tous-les-communiques-de-presse/examen-par-le-conseil-d-administration-d-edf-du-plan-
strategique-declinant-la-premiere-periode-de-la-programmation-pluriannuelle-de-l-energie-ppe> accessed 17 
November 2017.  
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reached. Yet, additionally to or instead of these tools, the lawmaker could have implemented 
other ones already in place in other countries. 
3.3. The missing tools to force the shutdown on the basis of energy policy 
Although the Energy Transition Act brought some changes to the sections of the 
Environment Code dealing with nuclear facility operation, shutdown and decommissioning,60 
the most needed tool to comply with the act’s targets was not included: a forced shutdown 
mechanism on the basis of state’s energy policy. 
Indeed, the two possible options to shut down a nuclear reactor remain the ones seen 
earlier in this paper: after voluntary request of the operator or ordered for safety reasons. It 
constitutes a missed opportunity, especially as article 187 of the Energy Transition Act 
modified the conditions to grant an operation license for electricity production facility, 
including criteria such as the energy nature, source and its role in the achievement of article L. 
100-4 of the Energy Code’s targets,61 and a compatibility requirement with the MEP.62 
Moreover, nuclear reactors, formerly not submitted to such authorisation,63 are now integrated 
into the common regime.64 As the energy policy goals are integrated into the authorisation 
criteria, they could have been into the shutdown criteria too.  
Such a provision was already adopted in at least two other European countries: Sweden 
and Germany. In Sweden, on 18 December 1997, the Act (1997:1320) on the Phasing-Out of 
Nuclear Power was adopted, allowing the Government ‘to revoke a permit to operate a 
nuclear power reactor on a date to be decided by the Government’, in order to organise ‘the 
                                                          
60 See Loi n° 2015-992 (n 15), art 126, 127. 
61 Energy Code, art L 311-5, 2°. 
62 Ibid para 7. 
63 P Sablière, ‘Le pilotage de la production d'électricité dans la loi de transition énergétique’ (2015) 10 Énergie – 
Environnement – Infrastructures, dossier 7, 3. 
64 Energy Code, art L 311-5-6. 
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transformation of the energy system’. The criteria to take the shutdown decision include 
location, age, design and importance to the national energy supply of the reactor. The act also 
provided for a compensation to be given to the operator, calculated on an estimated lifespan 
of 40 years.65 As Olav Torp and Ole Jonny Klakegg highlight, the two reactors shutdown in 
Barsebäck in the years following the adoption of the act were situated at ‘30 km from Malmö 
and only 20 km from Copenhagen, Denmark’, cumulating ‘more than three million people in 
two countries [living in their] neighbourhood’.66 The supreme administrative court validated 
the mechanism and the justification for the shutdown of the Barsebäck reactors, because of 
their location.67 Some French nuclear plants could be shut down on this basis, as many 
nuclear plants are situated close to important cities and/or borders.68  
In Germany, the Government went further as it directly planned and organised the nuclear 
energy full phase-out through a 2002 amendment to the German Atomic Energy Act. This 
amendment is the legal translation of an agreement reached between the nuclear plants’ 
operators and the Government.69 Alongside the prohibition to build any new reactor, the 
amendment limited the running reactors to an ‘average operating period of 32 years’ since 
their commissioning date, maintaining ‘an average residual operating period for German 
nuclear power plants of about 11.5 years’.70 This high foreseeability allowed the utilities to 
assess and plan their investments until the shutdown due date and for the state to be exempted 
of paying compensations.71 The German case experienced troubles when in 2010 the 
                                                          
65 ‘Sweden – General Legislation’ (1998) 61 Nuclear Law Bulletin, 86. 
66 O Torp, and O J Klakegg, ‘Challenges in Cost Estimation under Uncertainty—A Case Study of the 
Decommissioning of Barsebäck Nuclear Power Plant’ (2016) 6 Administrative Sciences 14, 9. 
67 ‘Case Law – Sweden’ (1999) 64 Nuclear Law Bulletin, 44. 
68 E.g. Nogent-sur-Seine, 110 km from Paris; Fessenheim, 75 km from Strasbourg, 40 of Bâle (Switzerland) and 
on the border with Germany; Cattenom, 35 km from Luxembourg; Bugey, 25 km from Lyon and 100 km from 
Geneva; or Gravelines, 85 km from Lille. 
69 A Vorwerk, ‘The 2002 Amendment to the German Atomic Energy Act Concerning the Phase-out of Nuclear 
Power’ (2002) 69 Nuclear Law Bulletin, 8. 
70 Ibid 10. 
71 A Rossnagel, and A Hentschel, ‘The legalities of a nuclear shutdown’ (2012) 68 Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 6, 61. 
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production quotas were extended, before to be brought back to their original level in 2011 
after the Fukushima accident (with some immediate shutdowns). The concerned operators 
then sued the state to obtain compensations for their 2010/2011 investments72 but the German 
Federal Constitutional Court validated the new phasing-out text, with the obligation however 
for it to include compensations.73 These models of legislations could have been applied as 
well in France, but nothing close took place.  
As no proper forced shutdown tool was adopted in the Energy Transition Act, a definite 
operation lifespan for nuclear reactors could have been created. Currently, there is none in 
France and the regime relies on 10-yearly ASN’s inspections.74 If such a limit would be 
implemented, then to extend it would require an administrative order which could be based on 
criteria including the achievement of article L. 100-4 and MEP’s targets, namely the nuclear 
75-50 by 2025 target.  
In the absence of these provisions, the real decision-makers regarding nuclear reactors 
shutdown in France remain their operator and the ASN but not the Government. 
Consequently, as Kostas Andriosopoulos and Stephan Silvestre report, the 75-50 by 2025 
target ‘remains theoretical to date’.75  
 
4. THE REMAINING LEGAL BARRIERS TO A FORCED SHUTDOWN PROCESS 
The lack of adequate tools to force the shutdown of various nuclear reactors in France 
after the Energy Transition Act can be illustrated by the Fessenheim case, the first shutdown 
planned after its adoption. During his 2012 presidential campaign, François Hollande 
                                                          
72 M Ludwigs, ‘Germany's Nuclear Phase-Out and the Right to Property’ (2016) 4 ENLR, 43. 
73 BVerfG, Judgment of the First Senate of 06 December 2016 - 1 BvR 2821/11. 
74 Environment Code, art L 593-18 and -19. 
75 Andriosopoulos and  Silvestre (n 21) 380. 
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promised to shut down the Fessenheim plant for three reasons: its age, being the oldest 
nuclear plant operated in France with its two reactors commissioned in 1978; its location, in 
an earthquake zone and below the level of the Grand Canal of Alsace; and for its proximity to 
the German and Swiss borders.76 However, these motives do not constitute an immediate 
safety risk according to the ASN,77 and then do not allow the Government to order the 
shutdown of nuclear reactors in Fessenheim, Haut-Rhin (68), on the basis of article L. 593-23 
of the Environment Code, without having to pay massive compensations for expropriation. 
The only way for the Government to shut down Fessenheim (as a first part of its 75-50 by 
2025 target to respect the nuclear cap when the EPR in Flamanville will be commissioned) 
would then be to negotiate with the operator of the plant, EDF. The purpose would be to reach 
an agreement in order to discourage EDF to sue the Government for a higher compensation - 
even though EDF is a subsidiary of the state, holding 83,1 per cent of its shares.78  
This negotiation is framed by the interpretation given to a couple of legal barriers: private 
property rights concerning the creation and operating authorisations, and the principle of 
legitimate expectation, which may have a direct impact on the creation of a compensation 
mechanism. 
4.1. The right to private property 
The question of the right to private property is a sensitive issue when it comes to forced 
shutdown of nuclear reactors, as it could possibly constitute a violation of this ‘sacred’79 right. 
                                                          
76 ‘Hollande :"Une centrale fermée en 5 ans"’ (Le Figaro, 2 May 2012) <http://elections.lefigaro.fr/flash-
presidentielle/2012/05/02/97006-20120502FILWWW00700-hollande-je-ne-fermerai-que-fessenheim.php 
accessed 17 November 2017. 
77 ASN, ‘Poursuite d’exploitation du réacteur n°2 de la centrale nucléaire de Fessenheim après trente années de 
fonctionnement’ (2013) 12. 
78 ‘Les participations publiques – Energie’ (Agence des participations de l’Etat, 2016-2017) 
<www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/agence-participations-
etat/Panorama_sectoriel_Energies.pdf> accessed 17 November 2017. 
79 Mentioned as such in the DDHC of 1789, art 17 <www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil-
constitutionnel/francais/la-constitution/la-constitution-du-4-octobre-1958/declaration-des-droits-de-l-homme-et-
du-citoyen-de-1789.5076.html> accessed 24 November 2017. 
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Therefore, both the 75-50 by 2025 target and the nuclear installed capacity cap were presented 
to the CC in order to decide whether or not they breach this right.  
In its decision of 13 August 2017, the CC provided elements based on private property 
right and the operating authorisation for electricity production facilities regarding the installed 
nuclear capacity cap. The question here was: as article 187 of the Energy Transition Act limits 
the total installed nuclear capacity to 63.2 GW (the total amount operated in 2015), while a 
total of 64.85 GW of creation and operating authorisations was already delivered, are these 
both types of authorisations80 providing their holder with a property right? 
The CC clearly answers that the authorisation to operate an electricity production facility 
cannot be considered as an asset subject to property rights by its holder.81 By consequence, 
there can be no expropriation. As for the creation authorisation delivered, the judge moves the 
debate to the ground of the principle of legitimate expectation. 
4.2. The principle of legitimate expectation 
It must be specified beforehand that the principle of legitimate expectation is not applied 
per se by the judge in France, apart for specific matters, such as european82 or tax law.83 Yet, 
legal scholars consider that the essence of this principle is applied through a proxy labelled by 
the CC as ‘legally established situation based on the guarantee of the rights proclaimed in 
article 16 DDHC’.84 This notion benefits from an extensive jurisprudence of the CC to 
determine the criteria for dismissing the protection of the legally established situation in the 
                                                          
80 The creation authorisation specifically for a nuclear reactor, added to the general operating authorisation for all 
electricity production facilities. 
81 CC, 13 August 2015, déc n° 2015-718 DC (n 46) cons 56. 
82 L IL, ‘Le principe de confiance légitime serait-il entré en droit public interne ?’ (2017) 3 Petites affiches, 6 – 
7. 
83 L Tartour, ‘Le principe de protection de la confiance légitime en droit public français’ (2013) 2 RDP, 311 – 
312. 
84 B Mathieu, ‘Sécurité juridique. Le respect de la légitime confiance des citoyens s’impose au législateur’ (Le 
Club des Juristes, 27 January 2014) <www.leclubdesjuristes.com/les-publications/securite-juridique-le-respect-
de-la-legitime-confiance-des-citoyens-simpose-au-legislateur/> accessed 10 March 2017. 
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name of the general interest and in order to preserve the role of the lawmaker. Even when it 
causes a negative impact on the incumbent actors’ situation.85 
In its decision of 13 August 2017, the CC acknowledges that the installed nuclear capacity 
cap affects the legitimately expected outcome of the legally established situations, that is to 
say, the authorisation to create the nuclear reactor EPR at Flamanville.86 Indeed, the holder of 
this authorisation could have expected to receive an operating authorisation once that the 
facility is completed and commissioned87 (even though there is no guarantee of such 
deliverance). However, the judge justifies this infringement of the rights of EDF in three 
points. 
First, the capping provision only creates effects when a new facility raises the total 
installed capacity over 63.2 GW. Consequently, there is no immediate abrogation of any 
authorisation. Second, the mechanism lets the authorisations holder choose which facility it 
will shut down to compensate the commissioning of the Flamanville reactor. At least this is 
what the law states, but in reality there is a strong political pressure to shut down the 
Fessenheim plant first. Third, it results from the parliamentary debates that the lawmakers 
intended to reach the diversification of the energy mix goal and to reduce the share of nuclear 
energy in the electricity mix. The CC then estimates that this measure is based on general 
interest objectives. Therefore, the infringement over EDF’s legally established situation is 
justified by sufficient and proportionate general interest purposes regarding the objectives 
pursued.88 
                                                          
85 B Plessix, ‘Sécurité juridique et confiance légitime’ (2016) 3 RDP, 799 – 806. 
86 Décret n° 2007-534 du 10 avril 2007 autorisant la création de l'installation nucléaire de base dénommée 
Flamanville 3, comportant un réacteur nucléaire de type EPR, sur le site de Flamanville (Manche). 
87 CC, 13 August 2015, déc n° 2015-718 DC (n 46) cons 57. 
88 Ibid cons 58. 
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Additionally, the CC specified clearly that the holder of an authorisation of creation which 
would have lost the possibility to obtain an operating authorisation can still request a 
compensation, hereby guaranteeing it can enjoy its rights.89 And this possibility leads to the 
following lines, which analyse the first of these bargains for compensation between EDF and 
the Government. 
4.3. The calculation of the operator’s compensation: the case of Fessenheim 
As EDF cannot claim expropriation in front of the judge but can still request a 
compensation for the forced shutdown of Fessenheim, this led to a negotiation between EDF 
and its principal shareholder, the state. As a 2015 parliamentary report highlights, the cost 
calculation for the shutdown and dismantling of a nuclear reactor is not an easy task.90 
Moreover, the lack of legal tools highlighted earlier means that a methodology to evaluate this 
cost must be elaborated as follows: evaluation of the cost of ending the operation; evaluation 
of the potential prejudice entitled for compensation, built on the expected remaining 
operational lifespan; and finally the cost of dismantling.91 Legally, the theory of the loss of 
opportunity could be used, limiting the compensation to the abnormal burden that the 
claimant could not have legitimately anticipated.92 If EDF is unsatisfied of the compensation 
attributed by negotiation, it can then file a complaint to the judge and request another 
compensation amount, based on a different calculation of the years the reactor is still expected 
to be operated, the cost per kWh, and the selling price on the electricity market.  
                                                          
89 Ibid cons 59. 
90 Mission d’information commune sur l’application de la loi n° 2015-992 du 17 août 2015 relative à la transition 
énergétique pour la croissance verte (2016, AN, 4157), 251. 
91 Ibid 255. 
92 See C Broyelle, ‘Les conditions de mise en jeu de la responsabilité du fait des lois’ (2012) 5 Droit 
Administratif, comm. 53, 4. 
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However, in 2017, an agreement was reached when EDF obtained satisfaction on a list of 
requests93:  
First, the Government extended the soon-to-expire creation authorisation of the EPR 
reactor of Flamanville.94 Second, the Government authorised the extension of the 
authorisation of temporary shutdown for the reactor Paluel 2, stopped for a longer time than 
planned because of an accident during the replacement of a core piece of the reactor.95 Third, 
the state will pay €490 million by 2021 to EDF, added to complementary payments until 2041 
calculated on the electricity market price and the average production of other reactors similar 
to the ones in Fessenheim.96 Fourth, this agreement was validated by the European 
Commission, concerning state aid law.97 
Multiple criticisms can be made about this agreement. It is not available to the public, 
impeding the unveiling of the calculation methodology, even though public money is 
engaged. The Government implicitly asserts that a nuclear reactor can be operated for 60 
years or more by accepting a compensation until 2041 (the reactors were commissioned in 
1978), while not a single reactor in France has ever reached this age. Last, the sum agreed on 
by the Government seems disproportionate in comparison with the amount that will probably 
be paid by the German Government after the 2010/2011 reversal for the shutdown of 17 
                                                          
93 EDF, ‘Comptes consolidés au 31 décembre 2016’, 49 ‘3.7 Protocole d’indemnisation relatif à la fermeture de 
la centrale de Fessenheim’ <www.edf.fr/sites/default/files/contrib/groupe-edf/espaces-dedies/espace-finance-
fr/informations-financieres/informations-reglementees/resultats-annuels/2016/pdf/2016-comptes-consolides-
20170214.pdf > accessed 24 November 2017. 
94 Décret n° 2017-379 du 23 mars 2017 modifiant le décret n° 2007-534 du 10 avril 2007 autorisant la création 
de l'installation nucléaire de base dénommée Flamanville 3, comportant un réacteur nucléaire de type EPR, sur le 
site de Flamanville (Manche). 
95 Arrêté du 26 janvier 2017 prorogeant la durée d'arrêt de fonctionnement de l'installation nucléaire de base n° 
104 exploitée par Electricité de France-société anonyme (EDF-SA) située sur la commune de Paluel (Seine-
Maritime). 
96 EDF (n 93). 
97 F Roussel, ‘Fermeture de Fessenheim : toutes les conditions sont remplies’ (Actu-environnement, 27 March 
2017) <www.actu-environnement.com/ae/news/fermeture-fessenheim-conditions-remplies-
28712.php4#xtor=EPR-1> accessed 28 March 2017. 
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reactors, estimated at a maximum of €2 billion,98 while the same operation for the two oldest 
reactors running in France will cost the taxpayer over €500 million. This expensive deal is the 
sanction for the lack of coherence between the Government’s targets and its legal tools, and 
for the lack of foreseeability provided to EDF.  
Finally, on 6 April 2017, the board of EDF declared the shutdown of its two reactors at 
Fessenheim ‘irreversible and inescapable’.99 But the utility specified that this shutdown will 
be launched at the moment the Flamanville reactor is commissioned, and at the condition that 
its shutdown is ‘necessary to respect the legal cap of 63.2 GW’.100 In this way, EDF expects 
to spare its Fessenheim reactors if finally other ones are shut down before, such as the 
temporarily stopped Paluel 2. Two days later, on 8 April 2017, the minister in charge of 
energy adopted a decree stating in article 1 that the operating authorisation of Fessenheim’s 
reactors was abrogated, before adding in article 2 that this abrogation will take place when 
EDF’s last conditions are met.101 The problem is that the legal quality of this decree is deemed 
as very poor by legal scholars. The anticipation of the legal effect of a request by the operator 
which did not occur yet and that remains uncertain is a matter of concern. As Julie Laussat 
writes, ‘the regulatory power abrogates an authorisation at the condition that its holder asks 
him to do so’.102 Thus, at the image of the legal regime to force the shutdown of nuclear 
reactors after the Energy Transition Act, this decree seems inefficient, inappropriate, and 
more about symbols than actual legal framework building. 
                                                          
98 B Wehrmann, ‘Germany's constitutional court backs speedy nuclear exit’ (Cleanenergywire.com, 6 December 
2016) <www.cleanenergywire.org/news/germanys-constitutional-court-backs-speedy-nuclear-exit> accessed 11 
March 2017. 
99 ‘Conseil d'administration d'EDF du 6 avril 2017: Fessenheim’ (EDF, 6 April 2017) <www.edf.fr/groupe-
edf/espaces-dedies/journalistes/tous-les-communiques-de-presse/conseil-d-administration-d-edf-du-6-avril-2017-
fessenheim> accessed 3 July 2017. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Décret n° 2017-508 du 8 avril 2017 portant abrogation de l'autorisation d'exploiter la centrale nucléaire de 
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The nuclear energy landscape in France is marked by the ageing of its numerous reactors 
and by a changing legal framework, specifically concerning the rules applicable to their 
shutdown.  
In an effort to promote the energy transition to renewable energy and diversify the 
electricity production mix, the Energy Transition Towards Green Growth Act adopted in 2015 
established a set of targets to make steps into this direction, including the objective to reduce 
the share of the nuclear energy into this mix from an average of 75 to 50 per cent by 2025.  
This paper provided an analysis of the legal tools created by the Energy Transition Act 
supposed to facilitate the achievement of the objectives laid down for nuclear energy 
reduction, especially by shutting down reactors. This paper argued that the three tools created 
by this law to facilitate nuclear reduction – installed nuclear capacity cap, strategic plan and 
Government commissioner – are inadequate to achieve this goal as all present serious 
loopholes or are simply not fitted for the forced shutdown of nuclear reactors on the basis of 
energy policy. Yet, other European countries, like Sweden and Germany, adopted appropriate 
legal provisions allowing to envisage the shutdown of a particular reactor (or of all of them) 
with foreseeability and rationality. They could have been reproduced and adapted in France, 
but so far, this has not been the case.  
The failure of the Energy Transition Act led to the conduction of ad hoc negotiations 
between the Government and the operator of the nuclear fleet in order to agree on the 
shutdown of the oldest nuclear energy plant in France, Fessenheim. As stressed in this paper, 
the first shutdown process since the adoption of the Energy Transition Act led to a costly 
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agreement setting a dangerous precedent for taxpayers’ money, crowned by a decree of 
inferior legal quality. 
At the end of the day, the legal framework for the forced shutdown of nuclear energy 
reactors on the basis of energy policy in France moved from non-existent to inadequate and 
inefficient between prior-to-2015 and 2017. This situation seriously imperils the achievement 
of the electricity production diversification goals and the realisation of the energy transition in 
France as decided by the Energy Transition Act in 2015.  
 
